been that analysis of this kind takes place when the artifacts in question have ceased to serve their original practical ends as vehicles of affect, after the funeral baked meats have at least had a chance to cool. Although Mrs. Gaskell's novels about the impoverished working class in nineteenth-century Manchester or Dickens's novels about the exploitation of children in factories were of course understood at the time to be "art," examinations of them were usually predicated upon their power to produce life-imitating experiences in their readers. Today, with the problems they dramatized no longer existing in the same forms as before, they are likely to be studied more impersonally and abstractly as aesthetic or historical artifacts divorced from any emotional force they may be capable of providing. As a matter of fact, one of today's greatest pretensions is that works of art can be examined in a purely "scientific" way-as language, psychology, philosophy, completely separated from the interests of any human audience for whom they were produced in the first place. And as the academicization of everyday life has speeded up since the eighteenth century, leading eventually to today's "information society," we now find commonplace the turning of "life" into subjects of study while the life is still quiveringly vital. Not only novels and poems of living writers, but the songs of the Beatles, films, TV programs-what we now call popular culture-have become subjects for dissertations, books, biographies, as the search for new materials and "information" becomes more and more desperate.
This rapid appropriation of both life and "expression" as materials for scholarly analysis can seem especially outrageous when the distinctive qualities and aims of the originals have been cast aside in order to pursue entirely other and different aims. And if politics, careerism, and the marketplace enter the picture, things can only seem worse.
A particularly concrete and intense enactment of these rather abstract considerations took place recently in the form of a furious debate between three black scholars in the normally sedate forum of New Literary History.1 With politeness thrown to the winds in what was for the principals a battle for survival, the reader becomes a voyeur at a singular exhibit of Hegelian "World History," a drama of geistesgeschichte in action. One can see in this conflict how inevitably and inexorably cultural positions develop, how certain stages of social evolution must necessarily be traversed, how an Emersonian phylogeny lurks behind the apparently "free" adoption of moral and intellectual positions. Not the least remarkable aspect of the initiating essay, "The Black Canon: Reconstructing Black American Literary History," by Joyce A. Joyce, was the fact of its acceptance in the first place. An impassioned piece, written in a voice strikingly different from the canonical ones of NLH, its very acceptance became one of the issues in the debate.
Joyce, an English professor at the University of Maryland, expresses her remorse at having been unsympathetic to a student who found an essay by James Baldwin difficult to understand. In defending Baldwin-she later came to feel-she was betraying an aspiring young black student by expressing her own "contradictions and elitism" (335). What Professor Joyce meant by this sense of betrayal (if I may interpret here) was that she had behaved like a rootless, professionalized, upwardly mobile intellectual rather than like a sisterly black, with the implication that such behavior means taking up a white "professional" point of view, a view in which texts, trendy ideas, and academic success take precedence over human obligations, especially to one's "people."
Since she had made use of them as negative examples, two other black academics were invited to enter the picture, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Houston A. Baker, Jr., both well-known cultural critics and Afro-American scholars. Contrasting them unfavorably with earlier black critics, Joyce remarked that "the function of the [black] creative writer and the literary scholar [in the past] was to guide, to serve as an intermediary in explaining the relationship between Black people and those forces that attempt to subdue them," whereas now there is a "denial or rejection of this role" (338-39) on the part of scholars like Gates and Baker. As Professor Joyce saw them, instead of acknowledging that black literature is a cry of the oppressed engaged in a practical struggle for survival as human beings, contemporary mainstream academics like Gates and Baker treat black literature simply as another set of "texts" to be processed according to the needs of careerism by means of the currently fashionable "poststructuralist" methodologies.
Speaking of today's reigning theorists, Joyce remarks that "their pseudoscientific language is distant and sterile. These writers evince their powers of ratiocination with an overwhelming denial of most, if not all, the senses." By constantly using such terms as "code," "sign," "signifier," "narratology," and "text," these writers "create the very alienation and estrangement" that they are attempting to undo (339-40).
Although she speaks of them only in passing, Professors Gates and Baker take up the gauntlet with a vengeance, for as a fellow black Joyce has struck sensitive nerves, always primed to be on the defensive. Gates, a professor of English, comparative literature, and African studies at Cornell, is the veritable leader of academic Afro-Amer-ican critical studies in this country. He has produced so many books and articles in recent years, either as sole author or editor, that it is barely possible to keep track of their titles. He is a gifted, sometimes brilliant intellectual: rhetorical, pugnacious, relentless, engaged in conducting a twenty-ring circus all at once and with considerable skill. He is also a paradigmatic exemplar of what I have come to call "academic capitalism," an enterprise that is complicated in his case by an admixture of self-righteous obsession with race, from which he is nonetheless able to extract every known academic perquisite. His most salient characteristics are his two well-worn metaphysical jumpsuits-one white, the other black-which he is able to zip on and off, sometimes in midsentence, with dizzying bravado as rhetorical needs urge him on. Although as an intellectual he is as white and bourgeois as I, he is nevertheless a virtuoso at exploiting white liberal guilt. Thus, he can play everyone against everyone else while presuming to emerge with virtue unscathed. His sense of unscathedness, however, is the personal myth that causes his undoing, for in reality he is no more pure than anyone else. It is principally his role in academic capitalism that has irritated Joyce A. Joyce, since as a black agent thereof he has risen like a rocket in the academy by alchemizing the primal metal of black writings into "texts" of gold, subjecting them to the currently fashionable "white" critical methodologies, and living off the academic capital produced therefrom. Furthermore, since "texts" are merely "woven goods" rather than the "expression" associated with "books," the academic textualist resembles a sewing machine operator processing yards of cloth, each as sewable as any other. Fancy stitches are what make for distinction, promotion, and bourgeoisification, yet while bourgeoisification is invariably part of even the most avant-garde academic's hidden agenda, radical good form requires that it always be furiously denied.
Houston Baker, though treated by Gates with the deference of a disciple, is in reality less of a master and more of a disciple than Gates. His earlier book, The Journey Back: Issues in Black Literature and Criticism, published in 1980, is a traditionally conceived work written in a clear and accomplished prose, but already dominated by a prior conversion to linguistic and rhetorical concepts that superimpose a grid of gratuitous complexities upon black writings. Concepts like "foregrounding" and "Sinnfeld" contribute about as much to an enhanced understanding of these works as Monsieur Jourdain's awareness that he is talking "prose." Baker's more recent book, Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature, is an astounding but mostly unreadable mixture of earlier writing in his lucid mode and more recent essays in the clotted, derivative, obfuscated jargon he has pro-duced since his almost instantaneous-but much too late-conversion to Continental epigonism (which he describes in his introduction like some radiant epiphany that transformed his life). Thus-to quote a passage at random-"Epistemological cataclysms in historical discourse bring to view dimensions of experience excluded from extant accounts. And in the reordering effected by such ruptures (i.e., their constitution of revised models), one discovers not only new historical terms but also the variant historicity of the statements and terms of a traditional discourse. In The Describing his own avant-garde interests and their failure to harmonize with either a mainstream or an academic majority, Baker castigates "black willingness to tread conservative/minstrel paths, and a multi-ethnic fear in the academy of new and difficult modes of critical and theoretical study" (368) and then concludes: "Further, to publish a grossly erroneous attack on Afro-American literary criticism in a journal traditionally devoted to Euro-American points of view and directed to a white audience could, I suppose, be profitable in an academic world where any attack whatsoever on anything AfroAmerican whatsoever is taken as a valuable sortie" (368-69).
Baker's response is preposterous to a self-discrediting degree when we consider the wide-ranging interests of NLH and Critical Inquiry, not to mention a multitude of other journals like Cultural Critique, Signs, Telos, and so on, that thrive on avant-gardism and ethnic studies. But just as Baker is still able to fancy that he represents a real avant-garde when his work is in fact indiscriminately derivative and epigonic, he is equally able to pretend that black critics and criticism are still not flourishing, neither in the academy nor in the journals, even in 1986. Not an inch is conceded, nor will he even refer to the Modern Language Association and its meetings and journal, which have been nothing if not receptive to pluralism and minorities. But Even more remarkable than this is an essay by Barbara Christian, also black, and a professor of Afro-American studies at Berkeley. In "The Race for Theory," referring to the academic hegemony of current theorists, she expresses concern that "theory" may be inappropriate for dealing with "emerging literatures." In what is virtually an echo of Professor Joyce, she notes that this hegemony is widely discussed, "but usually in hidden groups, lest we, who are disturbed by it, appear ignorant to the reigning academic elite. Among the folk who speak in muted tones are people of color, feminists, radical critics, creative writers, who have struggled for much longer than a decade to make their voices, their various voices, heard, and for whom literature is not an occasion for discourse among critics but is necessary nourishment for their people and one way by which they come to understand their lives better."5 As for the language of the reigning theorists, it "is repulsive to me and is one reason I raced from philosophy to literature, since the latter seemed to me to have the possibilities of rendering the world as large and as complicated as I experienced it, as sensual as I knew it was." And her conclusions resemble both Joyce's and Harris's: Now I am being told that philosophers are the ones who write literature, that authors are dead, irrelevant, mere vessels through which their narratives ooze, that they do not work nor have they the faintest idea of what they are doing; rather they produce texts as disembodied as the angels. I am frankly astonished that scholars who call themselves Marxists or post-Marxists could seriously use such metaphysical language even as they attempt to deconstruct the philosophic tradition from which their language comes. And as a student of literature, I am appalled by the sheer ugliness of the language, its lack of clarity, its unnecessarily complicated sentence constructions, its lack of pleasurableness, its alienating quality. It is the kind of writing for which composition teachers would give a freshman a resounding F. (56) One can well understand why Joyce, Harris, and Christian feel so deeply that this neoformalist criticism is a betrayal, an unclean and venal act in which the suffering and blood of black Americans-as well as a liberation that is still in progress-have been turned into a market commodity not completely removed from cabbage patch dolls and rock videos. When the classic writings of Afro-Americans are appropriated as mere "texts," patterns of words for deconstructive anal-ysis by upwardly mobile academics-some of whom, to add insult to injury, are themselves black-it is not impossible to regard this as a milder form of medical experiments on prisoners in concentration camps. It is an appropriation of lived life for other ends, a violation of the Kantian imperative, a failure to distinguish between "for itself" and "in itself," a blurring of the distinction between subjects and objects.
But set opposite this are a number of forces that Joyce and Harris fail to consider-those of self-consciousness, intellectuality, scholarship, history, knowledge-in a word, civilization. While thinking, analyzing, knowing, recording are violations of being, they are paradoxically the distinctively human activities that set us apart from the purely lived lives of animals. Professor Joyce's sense of herself as a betrayer when she defends James Baldwin's art over and above the aspirations of her black student is surely an epiphanal moment in the history of a consciousness, representing as it does a split in the self, a gulf between the obligations of blood and the obligations of mind. But if Knowing is a betrayal of Being, it is a betrayal that can't be stopped without our ceasing to be human. Thoughts cannot be unthought, innocence cannot be reinstated, nor can purity be brought back (especially when "purity" itself is open to question). The belief that there are original pure thoughts or experiences that are subsequently defiled cannot be substantiated because we can never get back to thoughts or feelings to which nothing is prior. Our deepest and most sacred states of being derive from prior states, with nothing that is "given" absolutely. There is no inviolable self because the "purity" of the self has already been compromised by our first acts of thinking, by our first assimilations of the imprint of our environment. At what point then could we decide to say, "From now on thinking about this subject is prohibited"? For at that point, someone would be bound to ask, "Why stop here rather than somewhere else? Why is Thought Number Three evil but Thought Number Two sacred?" Thus Joyce and Harris are both right and wrong when they object to the activities of Gates, Baker, and Stepto as sinister: the transformation of black literature into academic grist is indeed a sacrilege in the strictest sense. For here are these bourgeois mandarin types shedding crocodile tears about their black roots while at the same time cultivating those roots-with weird graftings superadded-for all they are worth, turning other people's flesh not into lampshades but into pelf, power, and professorships in the decadent academy.
Yet that is what knowledge is, however sinister its darker side. Nor is it for nothing that knowing has been connected with evil (though some people have believed it leads to a paradise happier far). But in this conflict between Being and Knowledge, even Professor Joyce has already been compromised: having partaken of the Tree of Knowledge (as professor and critic), she is past pure Being and well advanced into the depradations of Knowing. Surely Gates is right when he says that it is wrong to praise a black text simply because it is black. "Does the propensity," he asks, "to theorize about a text or a literary tradition 'mar,' 'violate,' 'impair,' or 'corrupt' the 'soundness' of a purported 'original perfect state' of a black text or of the black tradition?" (350). In expressing his own love for the black tradition and its works, Gates gives us little grounds to doubt his sincerity, although he ambiguously adds, "I am as black as I ever was, which is just as black as I ever want to be" (358).
Still, if Joyce and Harris's view is not intellectually as persuasive as they suppose, why do we feel that their objections are powerful nonetheless? We feel so, I think, because the black revolution is not yet over and it seems too early to academicize it in cold blood. We feel too that the various forms of postmodern criticism have their own serious problems, problems that can reduce any literature to inconsequence and that particularly distort the unique aspects of the Afro-American literary condition. With its elimination of the author, its view of words as engaged in a synchronic free play with no reference to a "real" world, its reduction of writing to self-canceling antinomies that ultimately say everything and nothing, its mandarin and technological jargon, its real character as a New Formalism that nevertheless derides the old formalism of "New Criticism": given all of these it seems outrageously, blindly, tastelessly inappropriate because, whether intentionally or not, it does appear to trivialize, as Norman Harris claims, the writings to which it fastens itself at the very same moment that these writings are working in the world.
When the chief practitioners of this variety of Afro-American criticism happen themselves to be blacks, but blacks who have left their roots far behind as they become ultra-bourgeois academic superstars; when for all practical purposes these black critics are "white" while retaining a privileged access to people whose plight provides the material basis for their own eminently successful escape-one does not have to possess unduly sensitive moral faculties to find grounds for protest. In reply to Gates's objection that he is not "antiblack," Professor Joyce explained that "a significant difference exists between being 'not' Black and being antiblack." By this, of course, she meant that Gates is essentially a white critic making use of black writings while reaping the benefits of his blackness. He himself refers to "our increasingly central role in 'the profession' " and adds that "I do not think my task as a critic is to lead black people to 'freedom.' My task is to explicate black texts. That's why I became a critic." But at the same time as they engage in such admirably candid confessions, both Gates and Houston Baker are apt to veer back to a sort of "minstrelsy" of their own when it suits them. Thus, Baker, in the process of exploiting the resources of white bourgeoisification in the academy, in the act of escaping from "minstrelsy," can allow himself to charge New Literary History with publishing Joyce's essay because "any attack whatsoever on anything Afro-American whatsoever is taken as a valuable sortie." This switch from scapegoat to sage and back again is much too facile for comfort.
Professor Joyce is also quite right to be outraged by Baker's anger at being criticized at the English Institute by a black woman while he himself goes on "unconscionably" to abuse Joyce herself in the pages of New Literary History. For her, this is another instance of the way in which blackness is at one and the same time used to propel a rising career while protecting it from assaults, not only by whites but by fellow blacks as well. This selective blackness, with its patronizing treatment of women, is the real basis of Joyce's protest, for her criticism of Gates and Baker is essentially a charge of moral blackmail against members of her own "family" who do not hesitate to kick her down so that they can rise up.
This ongoing debate derives most of its interest not from the rightness or wrongness of its principals' positions so much as from its exhibition of an evolving, conflicted consciousness. The case of Richard Rodriguez, whose writings describe his gradual separation as an intellectual from his Mexican-American family, his early achievement of fame as a token gifted member of a minority, and his surprising rejection of the academic perquisites that were heaped upon him, is not nearly so painful to witness. For Rodriguez was unusually conscious of his own psychology as well as those of his environments, and he quickly realized not only that you can't go home again, but that once you have chosen where you are going, you have to accept the consequences accompanying that choice. But in the present case, things have not worked out quite so well. Though Professor Joyce's love and loyalty with regard to her people can only command respect, and though her conscience as a professor can only be admired, her conflicted roles as black and as intellectual involve a psychic split that can never be healed without an alteration of perspective and a transvaluation of values. This is, however, a very common dilemma, experienced by everyone who has grown away from his family because of rejection of ethnicity, change of social class, or increased education. And in order to function as an intellectual, love-though one cer-tainly doesn't like to say it-is simply not enough. (I think, however, that Professor Gates has blundered in citing Tina Turner on this matter, for it betrays his somewhat hardboiled and excessively "playful" postmodern sensibility-and there is a point at which "playful" melts into "irresponsible.") But Professor Joyce has, nevertheless, caught Gates and Baker at a very vulnerable point not only in their own careers but in the careers of black studies and black liberation as well. There is no doubt that their services to black studies have been immense. They have lifted them out of the "right-on" folk-sentimental mutual backslapping of the sixties and given respectability to a university department that more often than not was hard pressed to justify its existence beyond power politics. But they have not yet come fully to terms with bourgeoisification, not only its profound connection to white mainstream culture, but their own indebtedness to it, without which they wouldn't even exist in their sometimes smug present incarnations. Like many other kinds of privileged intellectuals, they have yet to appreciate the general desirability of being middle class in America-even while enjoying its benefits-or to realize the extent to which they have not pulled themselves into it by their own bootstraps, even with all their superior gifts. Indeed, you don't have to be a neoconservative to recognize that individual success is less often due to prodigious gifts than to institutions that are already in place when you appear on the scene, institutions that have come about through other peoples' efforts rather than your own. Still, Gates's accomplishments are remarkable enough for him finally to throw away his two jumpsuits, to accept his bourgeois identity, to recognize Joyce's valid objections to various rootless (and ruthless) aspects of postmodern criticism, particularly in their application to black literature, and to acknowledge that both he and Professor Baker are now part of the Establishment, estranged from any supposed moral purity they may once have presumed to enjoy as blacks, while sharing the same obligations and liabilities as any other successful bourgeois professionals-obligations that must be met not in some nebulous future when perfect justice reigns on earth and racism has disappeared, but right now. Perhaps that's what love's got to do with it. 
